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Abstract
In this paper, we model price dispersion effects in over-the-counter (OTC) markets to
show that, in the presence of inventory risk for dealers and search costs for investors, traded
prices may deviate from the expected market valuation of an asset. We interpret this devia-
tion as a liquidity effect and develop a new liquidity measure quantifying the price dispersion
in the context of the US corporate bond market. This market offers a unique opportunity to
study liquidity effects since, from October 2004 onwards, all OTC transactions in this market
have to be reported to a common database known as the Trade Reporting and Compliance
Engine (TRACE). Furthermore, market-wide average price quotes are available from Markit
Group Limited, a financial information provider. Thus, it is possible, for the first time, to
directly observe deviations between transaction prices and the expected market valuation
of securities. We quantify and analyze our new liquidity measure for this market and find
significant price dispersion effects that cannot be simply captured by bid-ask spreads. We
show that our new measure is indeed related to liquidity by regressing it on commonly-used
liquidity proxies and find a strong relation between our proposed liquidity measure and bond
characteristics, as well as trading activity variables. Furthermore, we evaluate the reliability
of end-of-day marks that traders use to value their positions. Our evidence suggests that the
price deviations from expected market valuations are significantly larger and more volatile
than previously assumed. Overall, the results presented here improve our understanding of
the drivers of liquidity and are important for many applications in OTC markets, in general.
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Price Dispersion in OTC Markets: A New Measure of Liquidity
1 Introduction
The liquidity of financial markets is of crucial importance for diverse market participants such as corpo-
rations, investors, broker-dealers, as well as regulators. While there is an extensive literature on liquidity
effects in exchange-traded markets, particularly those for equities, there is very little research, thus far,
on these effects in over-the-counter (OTC) markets. Liquidity and its effects on prices have to be con-
sidered in all investment decisions, and this issue seems to be of special importance for illiquid markets,
particularly OTC markets, where prices are the result of bilateral negotiations between investors and
dealers. The objective of this paper is to bridge this gap by developing a tractable, theoretical model for
OTC markets and testing its implications empirically with US corporate bond market data. This market
offers a unique opportunity to study liquidity effects since, from October 2004 onwards, all OTC trans-
actions have to be reported to a centralized database known as the Trade Reporting and Compliance
Engine (TRACE). In addition, there is a valuation service provided by Markit Group Limited, which
surveys broker-dealers at the end of each trading day to obtain a composite quote for each security. The
combination of these two data-sets offers us an opportunity to construct a metric of price dispersion in
an OTC market, and to compare these results with trading-related liquidity measures such as bid-ask
spreads, which are often employed as proxies for this information.
OTC markets are especially interesting from the perspective of liquidity because of their trading archi-
tecture. In the absence of a centralized trading platform, buy and sell transactions have to be directly
negotiated by agents who need to contact one of the potential dealers in the market. Although bid-ask
quotations are normally posted by dealers, e.g., on Bloomberg or Reuters, these are not binding, i.e.,
they often only hold for small quantities or can be stale in some cases. Thus, investors potentially have
to negotiate with multiple dealers to trade at an acceptable price. This market structure is very different
from exchange-traded markets where a central order book is available to all market participants. Even
so, one might expect that in the absence of any market frictions, traded prices would still be equal to
the expected market valuation in OTC markets. Obviously, this is not the case in the presence of market
frictions, such as fixed costs and inventory risk for dealers, and search costs for investors. These market
imperfections could lead to traded prices that are potentially higher or lower than the market valuation
of a particular instrument. They could even result in situations where the instrument is traded at signifi-
cantly different prices, at approximately the same time. Therefore, these price dispersions are of interest
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when analyzing market liquidity. However, market-wide transaction data are generally not available for
OTC markets. A rare exception is the US corporate bond market, where the transaction data are col-
lected in a centralized database. Thus, our research is especially interesting, since price dispersion effects
between transaction prices and aggregated market valuations of securities are directly observable in the
US corporate bond market, using TRACE and Markit data.
Our paper makes three contributions to the literature on market microstructure and liquidity in the
context of OTC markets. First, we develop a new measure of liquidity based on price dispersion effects,
which we derive from our model. This measure is the root mean squared difference between the traded
prices of a particular bond, provided by TRACE, and its respective market valuation, provided by
Markit. Thus, it is an estimate of the absolute deviation, and, more importantly, can be interpreted as
the volatility of the price dispersion. Our analysis at the level of the aggregate market, as well as at the
bond level, shows that this price dispersion is significantly larger than quoted bid-ask spreads and also
shows more variation across bonds. This indicates that the overall liquidity of the corporate bond market
is rather low, and that liquidity, so far, could only be roughly approximated by quotations.
Second, we relate our price dispersion measure to conventional liquidity proxies. Thus, we show that the
new measure is indeed related to liquidity and identify reliable proxies, which are especially important
for OTC markets, where traded prices are not easily available. For this purpose, we test whether our
measure can be related to differential liquidity at the bond level, by relating it to commonly-used liquidity
proxies, i.e., bond characteristics, trading activity variables, as well as established liquidity measures used
in the academic literature. The resulting regression models show high explanatory power, and the effects
remain stable over time, indicating a strong relation between the price dispersion and liquidity-related
variables. According to our results, the most important liquidity proxies for corporate bonds are the
amount issued, maturity, age, rating, bid-ask spread, and trading volume, as well as the price impact
measure introduced by Amihud (2002). In the event, we find a strong relation between our liquidity
measure, the bond characteristics and trading activity variables. Therefore, our measure can potentially
be used to extract the liquidity component of corporate bond yield spreads.
Third, our results serve as an indirect test of the reliability of end-of-day marks provided by average prices
or bid-ask quotations. Using a volume-weighted hit-rate analysis, we find that only 51.12% of the TRACE
prices and 58.59% of the Markit quotations lie within the bid and ask range quoted on Bloomberg. These
numbers are far smaller than previously assumed. Since these marks are widely used in the financial
services industry, our findings may be of interest to financial institutions and their regulators.
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In the theoretical section of the paper, we develop a market microstructure model focusing on the price
dispersion effects in OTC markets. As argued earlier, these deviations can be interpreted as the effect
of liquidity in the presence of inventory and search costs. In this setting, a perfectly liquid market
is characterized by negligible deviations of traded prices from their market valuations, whereas illiquid
markets show large dispersions. Investors will perceive these deviations as indicative of the transaction
costs of trading, and consider them when making investment decisions. In the market microstructure
literature, price dispersion effects are explained by either fixed costs and inventory risk for dealers and
search costs for investors, or as arising due to asymmetry of information between traders and dealers.2
Garbade and Silber (1976) present one of the earliest price dispersion models in the context of the US
Treasury bond market. In their setup, investors with search costs are confronted with an exogenously
given probability distribution of potentially offered prices, when contacting an arbitrary dealer. Con-
sequently, investors will accept deviations from the perceived fundamental value, up to a certain point,
to avoid the marginal search costs arising from contacting an additional dealer. Similar ideas are put
forward in Garman (1976) and in Amihud and Mendelson (1980), where a centralized dealer with in-
ventory risk is confronted with stochastic arrivals of investors’ offers. The optimal inventory and price
setting policy are derived from the tradeoff between risk and return for each agent. Ho and Stoll (1980)
and Ho and Stoll (1983) focus on the competition among dealers by deriving equilibrium inventories and
market spreads. Grossman and Miller (1988) model liquidity events for risk-averse investors resulting in
an immediate need to trade the security. The investor can trade immediately by incurring a cost, or wait
one period, bearing the risk of adverse price movements. This tradeoff directly yields a liquidity cost
for immediacy and the optimal number of dealers. Bagehot (1971), Glosten and Milgrom (1985), Kyle
(1985), and Easley and O’Hara (1987), as well as many others who followed, introduce the concept of
informed traders versus liquidity traders and interpret bid-ask spreads as the compensation for adverse
selection. Huang and Stoll (1997) provide a simple model combining these different effects, and show,
based on stock market data, that order processing costs and inventory risk are the important components
of transaction costs. In a related paper, Hansch et al. (1998) show with data from the London Stock
Exchange that inventory determines dealer behavior. Bollen et al. (2004) provide a model which includes
other microstructure effects, such as the minimum tick size, the inverse of trading volume, competition
among dealers, and expected inventory holding premium. They demonstrate that their model performs
well for Nasdaq data.
Most of the aforementioned literature is in the context of a framework with a market-maker (or multiple
2See Amihud et al. (2006) for a comprehensive survey of the literature on liquidity.
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market-makers) with a centralized order book, an abstraction for an exchange-traded market. Turning to
models for OTC markets, Duffie et al. (2005) and Duffie et al. (2007) present a market with risk-neutral
investors who face stochastic holding costs, generating trading necessity. The availability of dealers and
investors is modeled by their respective trading intensities. The search time and relative bargaining power
determines equilibrium prices in their model. Green et al. (2007b) formulate a bargaining model where
costs and the bargaining power of the dealers determine the prices of securities in an OTC market. They
apply this model to a US municipal bond data set to show that dealers exercise substantial market power,
especially for smaller trades.
Additionally, several researchers have examined the important issue of market microstructure effects in
the primary market and their effects on secondary market prices. Green (2007) models the strategic
interaction of market participants in the primary and secondary market, in general, and discusses the
consequences of a secondary market with limited price transparency. Green et al. (2007a) quantify the
losses of traders and issuers given up to broker-dealers, resulting from trading in newly issued US munic-
ipal bonds. Goldstein and Hotchkiss (2007) examine the dealer behavior and trading activity at issuance
and find that the transparency introduced into the US corporate bond market following the establishment
of the TRACE database reduces underpricing effects and aftermarket dispersion.
Following the literature modeling the secondary market, we develop a tractable, but sufficiently realistic
model, to capture liquidity effects in an OTC market. To this end, we explicitly model the stochas-
tic inventories of multiple dealers and their capital costs/constraints, together with the search costs of
investors, abstracting from directly modeling issues relating to information asymmetry and adverse se-
lection. This simple, yet realistic, formulation allows us to obtain a clear interpretation for information
observable by investors in OTC markets. Our model relates these information sources to each other and
enables us to measure the degree of liquidity using TRACE prices and Markit quotations.
Building on this setup, in the empirical implementation of our model, we quantify our measure of price
dispersion in the context of the US corporate bond market, one of the largest OTC markets in the world.
Our data set covers 1,800 bonds with 3,889,017 observed transaction prices for the time period October
1, 2004 to October 31, 2006. This market is especially interesting for our purposes, as liquidity differences
across individual bonds seem to be rather pronounced: very few bonds are traded frequently, while most
other bonds are almost never traded at all.3 Differences in inventory risk and search costs are, therefore,
evident in this market, making it an ideal laboratory to test our model. We use our data set to analyze
3See Mahanti et al. (2008) for details of a cross-sectional comparison for the US corporate bond market.
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the price dispersion effect and its relation to liquidity at the level of the aggregate market and individual
bonds.
The empirical literature suggests a whole range of liquidity proxies in the context of corporate bond
markets. Several authors study the impact of liquidity, based on corporate yields or yield spreads over
a riskfree benchmark. Most of these papers rely on indirect proxies such as the coupon, age, amount
issued, industry, and rating; some papers additionally use market-related proxies such as the bid-ask
spread, trade volume, number of trades and number of dealers.4 In the more recent literature, indirect
estimators of transaction cost, market impact and turnover have been proposed to analyze liquidity.5
In the empirical section of this paper, we potentially contribute to this literature by presenting a new
measure of liquidity, and by showing its relation to conventional liquidity proxies.
Overall, we hope that our proposed market microstructure model based on the determinants of liquidity,
together with the empirical results, based on the unique data sets we employ, will improve our under-
standing of liquidity effects on prices in a relatively illiquid OTC market. Thus, our results are likely to be
relevant for many applications in OTC markets, in general, and US fixed income markets, in particular,
from the viewpoint of academic researchers, as well as practioners and regulators.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we develop our market microstructure model for OTC
markets and derive our liquidity measure. Section 3 introduces our US corporate bond market data set
and presents our results at the level of the market and individual bonds. Section 4 concludes the paper.
2 Model of Price Dispersion
We model a competitive market consisting of I assets and a continuum of dealers.6 The dealers face in-
ventory costs and quote bid and ask prices depending on their desired inventory levels, taking into account
the cost of holding inventory, as well as other costs such as those associated with asymmetric information
relative to informed investors, and fixed costs of trading. Several investors, who have exogenously given
buying or selling needs, trade with the dealers. The market is over-the-counter in nature, implying that
an investor has to directly contact dealers to observe their price quotes. In addition, investors face search
4See Elton et al. (2001), Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001), Houweling et al. (2003), Perraudin and Taylor (2003),
Eom et al. (2004), Liu et al. (2004), Longstaff et al. (2005), and De Jong and Driessen (2006).
5See Amihud (2002), Edwards et al. (2007), Chen et al. (2007), and Mahanti et al. (2008), for example.
6Using a continuum of dealers is clearly an abstraction of reality. If the number of dealer is finite, the investor
has to decide what to do if all available dealers have been contacted without obtaining a satisfactory quote. The
implications of this choice are discussed in Section 2.2.
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costs every time they contact a dealer, before they can trade. We model the decision problem for the
dealers and for the investors separately.
2.1 Dealers
We assume that there are I assets in the market, each indexed by the identifier i = 1 to I, and a
continuum of dealers of measure J . Dealers are of different types - each type with a different inventory
allocation. Without loss of generality, we may rank the dealers in terms of their inventory of asset i, and
use the index j to denote the type of dealer who holds an inventory si,j in asset i, which can be positive
(long) or negative (short). Hereafter, we refer to the dealer of type j as simply dealer j. Each dealer
faces an inventory holding cost function H that is convex in the absolute quantity of inventory held,
and is given by H = H(s), which includes cost of financing the position, as well as implicit costs due
to dealers’ capital constraints and risk aversion. The marginal holding cost of adding one (infinitesimal)
unit of the asset to the inventory is approximated by h = h(s) = H ′(s), assuming that the function H(s)
is differentiable in s, and has to be considered when trading the asset.
Dealers quote bid and ask prices for a market lot of one (infinitesimal) unit depending on their inventory
position, where the ask price of asset i quoted by dealer j is denoted by pai,j and the bid price is denoted
by pbi,j .
7 Each dealer takes the marginal holding cost and all other costs arising due to market frictions
not related to inventory, e.g., fixed costs of trading or costs due asymmetric information, into account
when quoting bid and ask prices. Suppose that the valuation of dealer j for asset i is given by mi,j ; then,
the outcome of considering these costs is the spread added to the dealer’s valuation for computing the
ask price and the spread subtracted from this valuation for the bid price. Denoting by fa and f b the
transaction cost functions which transforms the relevant cost components into these spreads, then the
bid and ask prices can be written as
pai,j = mi,j + f
a(h(si,j)) (1)
pbi,j = mi,j − f b(h(si,j)) (2)
Thus, the functions fa and f b can be interpreted as the transaction costs faced by an investor when
buying or selling from a particular dealer relative to the dealer’s valuation. Note that the bid and ask
7Note that we assume a market lot of one (infinitesimally small) unit across all dealers for simplicity. All the
results presented hold when we allow for differences in the desired lots across dealers, although the results are
somewhat more complex.
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quotes may be asymmetric around the valuation of the asset, as the dealer may have preferences to buy or
sell given his actual inventory. For instance, suppose a dealer has a long position in the asset in question,
then this dealer might be more willing to sell bonds than buy bonds due to the inventory costs, i.e.,
f b > fa in this case, since he is more reluctant to increase his inventory.
Turning to the market as a whole, we define the market’s aggregate valuation of asset i bymi representing
the expectation taken over all dealers:
mi = E(mi,j) (3)
We introduce this notation, as we base our price dispersion measure on the deviations of transacted prices
from the market valuation (see Section 2.3).
2.2 Investors
We define an investor as a market participant initiating a trade. In this context, an investor could also be
a dealer wishing to execute an inter-dealer trade. We now consider the problem from the point of view of
an investor trying to execute a trade consisting of a market lot of one (infinitesimal) unit. Assuming that
all dealers are identical from the point of view of the investor, let us denote the dispersion of ask prices
faced by an investor wishing to buy one unit of asset i by the density function gai (p
a) where pa is the ask
quote when contacting an arbitrary dealer.8 By the law of large numbers, this density function is well
approximated by the distribution of the dealer quotes. Suppose that the investor has already contacted
one dealer and is then evaluating the marginal cost and marginal benefit of contacting an additional
dealer. Let c indicate the cost of searching for another dealer, and pa,0 be the ask price quoted by the
dealer with whom the investor is already in contact. Following Garbade and Silber (1976), it can be
shown that the investor buys the asset at price pa,0 if:
pa,0 ≤ pa∗ (4)
where pa∗ is a reservation price which solves
c =
∫ pa∗
0
(pa∗ − x)ga(x)dx (5)
8In this analysis, we do not consider the effect of learning on the investor’s decision. In effect, we assume that
each potential transaction is a new decision for the investor with no experience from past trades.
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Similarly, it can be shown that an investor wishing to sell the asset does so if the bid price is greater than
a reservation price that solves:
c =
∫ ∞
pb∗
(x− pb∗)gb(x)dx (6)
Thus, the investor only contacts an additional dealer if the expected improvement in the offered price of
the bond is higher than the search cost. Given the continuum of dealers, the search of the investor will
ultimately be successful and results in trading with the first dealer offering a price within the reservation
price range.9
2.3 Price Dispersion in Equilibrium
We now proceed to parameterize the problem and draw explicit solutions for the dispersion of transacted
prices in equilibrium for specific assumptions about the density function of offered prices based on the
inventory distribution across dealers, the marginal holding cost function, and the transaction cost func-
tion. Let us assume that the investor’s view of the possible inventory of each dealer for an arbitrary
asset i before contacting him is given by an uniform distribution with support [si; si], i.e., all dealers
are identical for the investor in this respect.10 For simplicity, we assume that the inventory holdings are
distributed with a mean of zero, i.e., −s = s, suppressing the subscript i. Thus, we assume that the
expected net inventory across dealers is zero. For most markets, however, dealers’ net inventory is likely
be positive if the asset is in positive net supply. In such markets, our assumption can be interpreted in
the following way: the dealer’s inventory can be separated into two parts, a strategic position and an
inventory position attributable to the broker-dealer function. The first part of the dealer’s holding can be
assumed to be derived from a portfolio optimization decision. The setup presented here models only the
second part, which is assumed to be in zero net supply and to represent the relevant part of the holding
for setting prices.
Furthermore, let us assume that inventory holding costs are independent across assets. This implies
that the dealers solve the inventory holding problem for each asset independently ignoring any cross-
asset inventory effects and allows us to define the holding cost based on inventory s for the asset by the
9If the number of dealer is finite, one has to address the issue of the optimal choice of the investor if all dealers
have been contacted without obtaining a satisfactory quote. In this case, the investor has two choices: a) not to
trade, or b) to accept the best quote obtained from the available set of dealers. Both choices would considerably
complicate the analysis below, without offering additional insights.
10The specific results derived below are dependent on the distribution assumption. However, similar, but
perhaps more complex, results can be derived for alternative assumptions.
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following convex function
H =
αs2
4
(7)
where α is a positive constant which takes into account all relevant holding costs. This functional form
makes inventory holding costs symmetric, whether the inventory is held long or short. It also reflects the
increasing reluctance of dealers to hold inventories that deviate substantially from zero, reflecting both
capital constraints and risk aversion. This function implies that the marginal holding cost is linear in the
inventory holding of the dealer, and is given by:
h =
αs
2
(8)
Further, let us assume that the transaction cost functions of each dealer based on all relevant costs are
given by
fa = γ − h(s) (9)
f b = γ + h(s) (10)
In equation (9) and (10), the transaction costs are modeled as consisting of two parts. The first part,
i.e., γ, reflects the non-inventory costs of transacting one unit, including fixed costs of trading and costs
due to market frictions, e.g. asymmetric information. The second part represents the marginal holding
costs. Note, that the difference between fa and f b is due to the sign of the marginal costs, as trading on
the ask side results in an inventory change of minus one unit whereas a bid side trade results in a change
of plus one unit from the perspective of the dealer.
For convenience, we scale γ in our model, such that the lower bound of the transaction cost functions
is zero. This is achieved by setting γ = αs/2. Given this setup, the transaction cost functions result
in identical values for s equal to zero, i.e., the bid and ask quotes are symmetric around the dealer’s
valuation of the asset for a zero inventory position (see equations 1 and 2). For the largest possible long
position, i.e., s = s, the transaction cost function fa is zero and f b = αs representing the preference of
the dealer to sell bonds (and vice versa for the largest possible short position). In general,
fa =
α
2
(s− s) (11)
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f b =
α
2
(s+ s) (12)
In this setup, the transactions costs across dealers are uniformly distributed over [0;αs] for ask and
bid quotes, given the uniform distribution of the inventory and the transaction cost functions. Hence,
there exist dealers who trade at their valuation mi,j of the asset on a set of measure zero. Further, if we
assume that all dealers agree on the market’s expectation of the price, then by the definition ofmi,j = mi,
this implies that ask prices are uniformly distributed with support [m;m + αs] and that bid prices are
uniformly distributed with support [m− αs;m] (where we again suppress the asset index i).
Now consider an investor wishing to buy one unit of the security and facing a search cost of c for contacting
an additional dealer. Such an investor transacts with dealer j, if the ask quote paj ≤ pa∗ where
c =
∫ pa∗
m
(pa∗ − x)ga(x)dx =
∫ pa∗
m
(pa∗ − x)
αs
dx (13)
Solving the integral gives us the following relationship:
pa∗ = m+
√
2cαs (14)
Similarly, solving the equation for an investor wishing to sell one unit of the security gives us the following
relationship between the reservation bid price, the mean valuation m, and the search and inventory costs:
pb∗ = m−
√
2cαs (15)
Thus, the reservation price for buying (selling) is higher (lower) if the search cost c is high or the cost
of inventory holding for an asset is high or inventory is more dispersed across dealers. However, in
the absence of market frictions, all trades would take place only at the market’s valuation m. With
frictions, transactions take place if the offered ask price is less than the reservation ask price, or if the bid
price is greater than the reservation bid price. In this setup, two different intervals for the transaction
prices are possible depending on the level of the search costs: If the search cost is sufficiently low (i.e.,
c ≤ αs/2), transactions are distributed over [pb∗; pa∗], i.e., reservation prices restrict the set of offered
prices. If the search cost is higher than this critical value, investors will accept any prices offer by dealers
and transactions will be distributed over the interval [m − αs;m + αs]. In either case, market frictions
determine the magnitude of potential deviation of the transaction price from the market’s valuation, i.e.,
they determine the price dispersion of the asset.
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We assume that dealers have no incentive to directly reverse all trades in the inter-dealer market and that
investors cannot obtain additional information of dealers’ actual inventory from past trading activity, i.e.,
all investors perceive the inventory of all dealers to be uniformly distributed with the given support at all
points in time. We further assume that the appearance of investors wishing to buy and sell the asset is
equally likely; hence, transactions are uniformly distributed over the derived intervals in equilibrium. In
such a situation, the actual measure of the price dispersion is the variance of transacted prices pk around
the market’s expectation of the price m given by:11
E(pk −m)2 =
{ 2
3cαs if c ≤ αs/2
1
3α
2s2 otherwise
(16)
Again, this variance is a function of the market frictions, i.e., increasing in the search cost of the investor c
(if the reservation prices are binding, i.e., c ≤ αs/2), the inventory cost and the distribution of inventories
across dealers for that asset. Note that the variance (or volatility) of the price dispersion can be estimated,
if the transaction prices and the respective valuation of the market are available. Thus, this derivation
of the price dispersion variance is the main result of our model, which we use to define a new liquidity
measure in Section 2.4.
Although the explicit functional form of the price dispersion measure derived above depends on the
uniform distribution for dealers’ inventory, the general result that it depends on search costs and the
marginal holding costs will always hold in this framework. Furthermore, we have confirmed that the
general nature of our results is presumed when the model is extended to cases where the expectation of
the market value is estimated with error by the dealers.
In some markets, the average or median bid-ask quotes across all dealers are made public, e.g., at the
end of the trading day. Often, it is assumed that these quotes represent bounds, within which most of
the trades take place. Much discussion is ongoing whether this is a realistic assumption. Our model can
provide an analytic solution to explore this question. We define the hit-rate along the lines of Bliss (1997),
who calculates the percentage of cases where a certain price lies within the range spanned by bid and ask
quotations. We define the hit-rate HR as the percentage of trades that fall within the median bid-ask
quote; then, this percentage in our model is represented by the probability that a traded price in the
possible range lies within the mean or median bid-ask quote represented by the range [m−αs/2;m+αs/2].
Three different ranges for the hit-rat are possible depending on the level of the search costs: If the search
11This results follows directly from the functional form of the variance for an uniformly distributed random
variable.
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cost are lower than αs/8, then no prices above the median bid-ask quote are accepted by the investors
and the hit-rate is 100%. If the search costs are greater than αs/2, then all quotes are accepted by
investors and the hit-rate is 50% by construction. For intermediate search costs, the hit-rate depends on
the market friction parameters:
HR =

50% if c > αs/2
αs
2
√
2cαs
=
√
αs
2
√
2c
if αs/8 ≤ c ≤ αs/2
100% if c < αs/8
(17)
This implies that the hit rate increases when the cost of searching c is lower, or when the inventory cost
and the dispersion of quoted spreads given by αs is higher. It is also clear that there is no reason for the
hit rate to be close to 100%, as this is determined by market frictions. In fact, in general, the hit rate
depends on both how dispersed quotes are, and how costly it is to search for a new dealer. When quotes
are dispersed, and it is costly to search for new dealers, transacted prices may be regularly outside the
mean or median bid-ask spread observed in the market.
2.4 Liquidity Measure
Based on the framework presented in the previous sections, we propose the following new liquidity measure
to quantify the price dispersion per bond on a daily basis. The measure is based on the transaction prices
and volumes, and on the respective market’s expectation of the price: On each day t, for bond i, we
observe Ki,t traded prices pi,k,t (for k = 1 to Ki,t) and one market-wide valuation mi,t. Each traded
price has a trade volume of vi,k,t. Based on this information, we define the new liquidity measure di,t as
di,t =
√√√√ 1∑Ki,t
k=1 vi,k,t
·
Ki,t∑
k=1
(pi,k,t −mi,t)2 · vi,k,t (18)
This measure represents the root mean squared difference between the traded prices and the respective
market-wide valuation based on a volume-weighted calculation of the difference. Thus, this measure is
an estimate of the absolute deviation, and, more importantly, has the interpretation as the volatility of
the price dispersion, as derived in equation (16). Therefore, this measure, which can be thought of as
the reduced form of the model presented earlier, is of empirical interest, when analyzing price dispersion
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effects.12
We use a volume-weighted difference measure since we assume that price dispersions in larger trades
reveal more reliable deviations from the market’s average valuation. Furthermore, this weighting can be
seen as a device for the elimination of outliers of potentially erratic prices for particulary small trades.
Alternatively, for such trades, we could have excluded trades below a certain trade size. However, this
may not be appropriate as the average trade size can vary significantly across bonds.
Note that, in this calculation, we implicitly assume that the difference between the traded prices and the
market-wide (end-of-day) valuations is not influenced by the trading time during a particular day. In
other words, we treat all transactions occurring on a given day as arising at the same time. Thus, we
assume that intra-day price volatility unrelated to liquidity, for instance caused by shifts in the yield curve
or the credit spreads, has only a second order effect. Given the infrequency of trades in the corporate
bond market, this is not an unreasonable approximation. However, we analyze the robustness of our
measure with respect to changes in this assumption in Section 3.2.3.
3 Empirical Analysis
According to the model presented in Section 2, inventory risk and search costs determine the probability
distribution of prices for buy and sell transactions of investors in OTC markets. Hence, in our framework,
illiquidity is interpreted as the potential cost of trading in the presence of these frictions. The less liquid
an asset, the more likely is a significant deviation of the actual observed transaction price from the
market’s expectation of the price. In our empirical example, we analyze the liquidity of the US corporate
bond market. This market is an important and well-known financial market, and especially interesting
for our purposes, since liquidity differences between individual bonds appear to be rather pronounced.
We quantify our liquidity measure and analyze the price dispersion effects at the market and individual
bond level. In particular, we relate our measure to conventional liquidity proxies to confirm that it
indeed represents liquidity. Furthermore, we compare our liquidity measure with bid-ask spreads quoted
on Bloomberg, a data vendor, to allow for an economic interpretation of the results. This is especially
of interest, as bid-ask spreads themselves are generally regarded as proxies for price dispersion effects as
12Using the model presented, this measure could be calculated based on the investors search costs, the dis-
tribution of inventory across dealers, and the marginal holding cost, see equation (16). This information is in
general not accessible. However, in Section 3.2.3, we provide some estimates of the dispersion based on reasonable
parameter values of the model input.
14
well, and are often used to measure liquidity effects, since transaction data are rarely available in OTC
markets. By exploring the actual hit-rate for the data set, our analysis may point to the validity of using
the bid-ask spread as a liquidity metric.
3.1 Data Description
The US corporate bond market offers a unique opportunity to calibrate and test market microstructure
models. Unlike other OTC or dealer markets, a central data source exists for all transactions in this
market. The National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD), now known as the Financial Industry
Regulatory Authority (FINRA), established the Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE) in
October 2004, making the reporting of all transactions in US corporate bonds obligatory for all bro-
kers/dealers under a set of rules approved by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). TRACE
reporting by broker-dealers was introduced in three consecutive phases.13 Phase I started in July 2002
and covered only reporting for the larger and generally higher credit quality issues. Phase II expanded
the dissemination to smaller investment grade issues. Phase III started on October 1, 2004 and reporting
then covered all secondary market transactions for corporate bonds. As a result of the TRACE initiative,
we can obtain all transaction prices and volumes for this market, whereas in other OTC markets, this
information has either to be approximated by using transaction data from only one or a small set of
dealers, or by using bid-ask quotations instead.
Besides the transaction data, a second important source of valuation/mark-to-market information exists.
This data set is provided by Markit Group Limited, which was founded in 2001 as a private company.
One of its services is to collect, validate, aggregate, and distribute end-of-day composite bond prices,
where the input information is collected from more than thirty major dealers in the market, who provide
price information from their books and from automated trading systems.14 Various data cleaning and
aggregation procedures are applied, and thus, the resulting Markit quotations can be interpreted as a
market-wide average or expectation of the price of a particular bond.15 Markit quotations are publicly
available for a fee and are used by many financial institutions as the main price information source to
mark their portfolios to market, since they are seen as more reliable than end-of-day bid-ask quotations.
Combining TRACE prices and Markit quotations allows us to calculate our liquidity measure for the US
corporate bond market.
13See National Association of Securities Dealers (2006).
14See Markit (2006).
15Ibid.
15
Our data set consists of TRACE prices, Markit quotations, and Bloomberg bid-ask quotations (close ask
/ close bid) available for the time period October 1, 2004 to October 31, 2006. This period starts just after
the implementation of Phase III of the TRACE project, when all secondary market transactions were
reported to the database. For our analysis, we include only coupon- and floating-rate dollar denominated
bonds with a bullet or callable repayment structure, without any other option features, which were traded
on at least 20 days in the two year period. Furthermore, we restrict our sample to bonds for which issue
ratings from Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s, or Fitch are available, to include credit information, facilitating
the study of the correlation between credit risk and liquidity in our analysis. Even with these restrictions,
the data sets results in 1,800 bonds with 440,076 Markit/Bloomberg quotations and 3,889,017 TRACE
prices. Note that there is only one data point per bond and day available from Markit and Bloomberg,
whereas typically several transactions are reported in TRACE for the more liquid bonds.
As a result of the screening criteria we use, the selected bonds represent 7.98% of all corporate bonds
available in TRACE, i.e., of all bonds that had at least one trade in TRACE in the observed time period.
However, our data set accounts for an amount outstanding of $1.308 trillion, which represents 25.31% of
the total amount outstanding of all bonds as on June 30, 2006.16 Based on the share of trading activity,
the selected sample represents even a higher proportion, accounting for 37.12% of the total trading volume.
Thus, our data set is representative of the US corporate bond market, with the advantage that each bond
in the sample has sufficient observations along with important additional variables for empirical analysis.
Overall, the selected bonds represent an important segment of the corporate bond market with a slight
bias toward those with high liquidity compared to the rest of the market. As Edwards et al. (2007)
report for their TRACE sample from 2003, only 16,746 bonds out of almost 70,000 have more than 9
trades per year and Mahanti et al. (2008) report that over 40% of the bonds in their sample, do not even
trade once a year. Note that, in our sample, liquidity effects are not likely to be as pronounced as in the
whole market, and therefore, finding significant effects in this sample would only strengthen our liquidity
argument in the larger universe. However, even this selected segment has rather low overall liquidity. To
emphasize this point, Table 1 shows the trading frequency of our bond sample measured by the number
of trading days for the two available one year periods, i.e., 10/2004 to 10/2005 and 10/2005 to 10/2006,
respectively.
[Table 1 around here.]
16The amount of bonds outstanding on June 30, 2006 was $5.167 trillion, based on data from the Bond Market
Association, supplied by Reuters.
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The bonds are divided into five equally spaced categories, i.e., traded on up to 50, 51 to 100, 101 to
150, 151 to 200, and on more than 200 days per year. Table 1 shows that the bonds are nearly evenly
distributed over the categories with a slightly higher concentration in the lowest category, i.e., 27.39%
of all bonds in the first one-year period and 26.94% in the second period show very low trading activity
with less than 50 trades per year indicating low overall liquidity.
For a bond-level analysis of these liquidity effects, we add bond characteristics and trading activity
variables to our data set. The bond characteristics contained in our data set include coupon, maturity,
age, amount issued, issue rating, and industry, and the trading activity variables are trade volume,
number of trades, bid-ask spread, and depth (i.e., number of major dealers providing a quote to Markit)
per bond. The issue rating represents the actual rating of a bond as on October 1, 2007, obtained from
Bloomberg (or, for matured bonds, the last valid rating), and therefore is a rough proxy for the rating at
the end of the selected time period. For all other variables we have the complete time-series available.17
[Figure 1 and Figure 2 around here.]
Figure 1 and 2 show the distribution of bonds across industries and credit rating grades, respectively.
The industry categories in Figure 1 are obtained from Bloomberg. The ratings in Figure 2 represent
the ”average” issue rating per bond from Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s, and Fitch, generated by first
transforming the individual ratings to numerical values (AAA=1 to CCC=7) and then using the rounded
mean. The industry distribution shows the expected result that the sample has higher concentrations in
the banking/financial and the industrial sectors. The rating distribution is also skewed, with a higher
concentration in investment grades bonds, especially in the A and BBB ratings. These numeric values
are directly used in the regression analysis, presented in the next section.18
[Table 2 around here.]
Table 2 shows the distribution of all the other variables at the bond level, where time-variant variables
are represented by their time-series averages. For the trading activity variables, the average is computed
by averaging the values for days on which the bond was actually traded, i.e., the average is conditional
on trading. The coupons and bid-ask spreads of the bonds are in the ranges of 1.95% to 11.25% with a
median of 6.125%, and 1.55 bp to 90 bp with a median of 32.17 bp, respectively. The maturity spectrum
17For floating-rate bonds, we have the time-series of actual coupon rates available.
18Alternatively, the ratings could have been represented by their probability of default (PD) equivalents. How-
ever, since each rating agency provides different PD estimates and does not clearly state the specific time horizon
over which the ratings are calibrated (and whether ratings are at all calibrated on PDs), we do not apply such
procedures.
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shows a concentration of bonds with a maturity of up to ten years. The amount issued is quite dispersed
going from $100 million up to $6.5 billion with a median of $500 million. The average trade volume
per day goes from just over $100,000 up to $61 million with an median of $2.8 million. The average
number of trades per day goes from one trade to 121 trades with a median of 4 trades. The depth of
the Markit quotations shows that, on average, quotes come from five dealers with a minimum of three
and a maximum of thirteen.19 Overall, these summary statistics indicate that the chosen portfolio is
representative and comparable to data sets used by prior studies on this market.20
3.2 Results
3.2.1 Market Level Analysis
We are mainly interested in the deviations between TRACE prices and Markit quotations when analyzing
liquidity based on price dispersion effects in the context of the US corporate bond market. Assuming
that the Markit quotation represents the mean of the price dispersion distribution, we would not expect
that the average deviation (where positive and negative differences cancel out), in the market as a whole
would be biased in either a positive or negative direction. In our data set, this volume-weighted average
difference between TRACE prices and respective Markit quotations is 4.88 bp with a standard deviation
of 71.85 bp, i.e., on average, we find that the Markit composite is slightly lower than the TRACE price:
However, the difference does not indicate an economically significant bias, given that the average quoted
bid-ask spread on Bloomberg is 35.90 bp in this market.
Turning to the analysis of price dispersion effects, we calculate our proposed liquidity measure for each
bond on a daily basis. The measure represents the root mean squared difference between the TRACE
prices and the respective Markit quotation. To analyze the liquidity of the corporate bond market as
a whole, we calculate the average of this liquidity measure over all bonds and all days. The resulting
average root mean squared difference is 49.94 bp and the standard deviation of this liquidity measure is
63.36 bp. This large variation is mainly driven by the cross-sectional differences across bonds: taking
the time-series average of the measure for each bond, we find a minimum of 1.99 bp and a maximum as
high as 351.90 bp (with 10% quantile of 16.42 bp and 90% quantile of 97.99 bp). Overall, we find large
19Note that Markit collects data from more than thirty dealers, but not all dealers provide information for each
bond on every day.
20See, for example, Edwards et al. (2007) and Mahanti et al. (2008).
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differences between traded and expected prices, indicating a rather low overall liquidity.21
As expected, the liquidity measure for the whole corporate bond market is larger than the average quoted
bid-ask spread of 35.90 bp. A t-test for equal means reveals that the mean of our measure is significantly
higher than that observed for the bid-ask spread. Even more pronounced than the difference in the means
is the difference in the standard deviation which is nearly three times larger, as the standard deviation
of the bid-ask spreads is 23.73 bp. This difference can also be illustrated by the following statistic: our
liquidity measure is larger than the quoted bid-ask spread in 50.59% of all cases, i.e., we find that bid-ask
quotations can only roughly approximate liquidity costs.
Basically, there are two approaches for computing the price dispersion measure. One approach is the
market-based computation using TRACE prices and Markit quotations presented above. An alternative
approach is to compute the measure directly based on the parameters of our model, i.e., the investors
search costs, the distribution of inventory across dealers, and the marginal holding cost (see equation 16).
These data are, in general, not accessible. However, an interesting question is whether we can produce
similar results with our model if we assume reasonable ranges for the model inputs. The following example
shows that the resulting measure of dispersion can indeed be seen as realistic: Assume that for a one
million dollar trade, the search cost c is $100, the largest possible position s is $100 million, and holding
cost α is 0.004 (e.g., 8% p.a. capital holding with 30% p.a. cost of capital and an average holding of two
months, 0.08 · 0.3/6 = 0.004). Then, the resulting price dispersion is 51.64 bp for a face value of 100%.
This value is in line with the overall price dispersion we compute in our empirical analysis. Furthermore,
as there is a linear relation between the inputs and the price dispersion measure, the example shows that
using a realistic range of inputs, the bond-specific variation can also be readily explained.
As mentioned in Section 2.4, in the calculation of our liquidity measure, we implicitly assume that
the difference between the traded prices and the market-wide end-of-day valuation is not influenced by
the trading time.22 This is a strong assumption. However, in our data set, we do not find any time
dependence during the trading day. As a straight-forward test of this assumption at the level of the
market, we calculated our measure using prices before 1 pm and after 1 pm, respectively, as 1 pm is the
median trade time. We find, that the difference is statistically insignificant and even has the wrong sign,
i.e., the price dispersion measure is higher for prices closer to the end of the trading day. The result
21These results rely on the interpretation of the Markit quotes as being the market’s expectation of the price.
In case these quotes are noisy measures of the expected prices, we would still find a high overall price dispersion
in an analysis at the market level. However, there would presumably be no relationship between these price
dispersions and liquidity. Note that our interpretation of low liquidity at the market level will be justified by the
results at the bond level presented in Section 3.2.3, where we find a significant relation to liquidity.
22This assumption is necessary as we have only one bond-specific market-wide valuation per day available.
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stays the same when we compare the measures calculated with prices from two separated time spans,
i.e., before 12 pm and after 2 pm, as a stress test. These results show that price volatility unrelated
to liquidity is not the main driver of our price dispersion measure. As additional supporting analysis
(not reported in detail), we test whether bonds with more volatile market valuations (i.e., higher return
volatility in the Markit prices) have higher price dispersion measures. We find a marginally statistically
but not economically significant relation between these variables showing that price moves unrelated to
liquidity are of minor importance for the price dispersion measure.
Summing up the market level analysis, we find significant differences between TRACE prices and Markit
composite quotations that cannot be simply explained by bid-ask spreads or trade time effects. The
model presented earlier relates these differences to liquidity. The large variation of our liquidity measure
across bonds strengthens the liquidity argument as a quick analysis also shows significant differences in
the trading frequency, as documented in Section 3.1. The question arises whether the hypothesis that
our measure represents liquidity can be further supported by bond level analysis.
3.2.2 Bond Level Analysis
In the analysis at the individual bond level, we relate our liquidity measure to bond characteristics and
trading activity variables, which have been used or proposed as liquidity proxies by other researchers.
A strong relation between these variables and the new measure would support our liquidity argument.
As bond characteristics, we use the coupon, maturity, log(amount issued), age, rating and industry. As
proxies for trading activity we employ log(trade volume) in TRACE, number of trades in TRACE, number
of reporting dealers in Markit, and the bid-ask spread on Bloomberg. Table 3 presents the correlations
between the time-weighted averages of these variables and the price dispersion measure across bonds.
[Table 3 around here.]
The table shows high correlations between almost all variables and our liquidity measure. Figure 3 shows
this relation graphically for six variables.
[Figure 3 around here.]
To formally test for a significant relationship between our measure and the other variables, we employ
cross-sectional linear regressions, again using time-weighted averages of the variables. We present results
using time-averages based on the whole time period, as well as based on each available quarter (2004 Q4
to 2006 Q3), to check whether time-series effects drive the results and have to be considered explicitly.
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Univariate regressions (not presented in detail) reveal that basically every variable has a statistically
significant relation with our measure, whereas the R2s vary considerably.23 We use the univariate results
to build a multivariate regression model explaining the observed bond-specific liquidity measure. Table
4 presents the resulting coefficient estimates.
[Table 4 around here.]
The results for the multivariate regression for the whole time period shows the high explanatory power
of the model represented by an R2 of 61.5%. Considering the regressions for the individual quarters, we
again find high values for the R2 varying between 44.9% and 51.3%. These numbers are impressively
high and extremely stable over time showing a strong relation between our measure and liquidity-related
covariates. The variables turning out to be significant in the multivariate model are maturity, amount
issued, age, rating, bid-ask spread, and trade volume, i.e., the price dispersion measure shows a strong
relation to bond characteristics, as well as to trading activity. Their influence and statistical significance
stays surprisingly stable over time. All the variables have the expected sign, as explained in the next five
paragraphs.24
To illustrate the influence of the different variables, we show the effect on our liquidity measure caused by
a one standard deviation change in a particular explanatory variable, as calculated from the available set
of bonds. The variable with the strongest effect is the actual maturity of the bond. The liquidity measure
of bonds with a one standard deviation greater maturity than other bonds (i.e., longer maturity of 7.11
years) is expected to be 13.09 bp higher, i.e., the higher the maturity the lower the underlying liquidity
of the bond. Analyzing our data set in more detail, we find that bandwidth maturities between zero and
ten years show minor effects on the liquidity measure. The regression parameter seems to be driven by
the lower liquidity of bonds with maturities of more than ten years (see Figure 3). This is an expected
result as these long-term bonds are mainly held by ”buy-and-hold” investors such as pension-funds and
insurance companies, which match the duration of the bonds they hold with that of their long term
liabilities. Consequentially, the liquidity of these bonds is expected to be low.
The bid-ask spread has the second strongest effect. As expected, we find a positive correlation with our
price dispersion measure (see Figure 3). A one standard deviation increase in the bid-ask spread (i.e.
23The number of reporting dealers in Markit has the lowest univariate explanatory power represented by an R2
of 3.57% and the bid-ask spread has the highest explanatory power represented by an R2 of 39.96%.
24As a robustness check we use regressions with clustered standard errors for identical issuers. This is done to
check the effects of correlation of the errors across bonds issued by the same obligor. The results stay virtually
identical and are not presented here, to conserve space. In view of this finding, the subsequent analysis is conducted
at the bond level, treating the observations as being independent.
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20.23 bp higher bid-ask spreads) results in a 11.49 bp increase in the price dispersion measure. This
indicates that the bid-ask spread can roughly proxy for the effective costs of inventory risk and search
costs, and thus, has a relation to liquidity as argued in many papers. However, the magnitude may not
exactly be in line with the liquidity costs, as we would expect a one-to-one relation in this case.
We find the expected negative correlation between trade volume and the liquidity measure. The effect is
-6.88 bp for a one standard deviation increase in log(trade volume). This parameter shows that variables
that are directly related to trading activity have a clear influence on the liquidity measure. However,
the influence is lower than expected, given that other characteristics have a stronger influence. This
result shows that trading activity itself is an important aspect of liquidity, but it is not the only variable
determining the price impact for instantaneously trading large volumes.
A positive correlation can be found for the age of a bond. A bond with a greater age has a lower liquidity
(one standard deviation, i.e., 2.87 years, results in an increase in the price dispersion of 5.93 bp). This
can be attributed to the well-known effect of “on-the-run” and “off-the-run” bonds, where much higher
liquidity is available for newly issued bonds (i.e., “on-the-run” bonds) compared to the liquidity after the
bonds have been outstanding for some time (i.e., “off-the-run” bonds).
Our results indicate lower liquidity for lower credit quality bonds as is assumed by most market partic-
ipants (one standard deviation, i.e., approximately one rating grade, results in an increase in the price
dispersion of 4.67 bp). Analyzing our data set, we further find that the results of the credit quality
variable are mainly driven by the difference between investment grade and speculative grade bonds (see
Figure 3). As expected, liquidity is higher for the investment grade segment.25 Based on the resulting
regression parameter, the difference in the liquidity measure between an average investment grade and
speculative grade bond (represented by a difference of four ratings grades) is 18.68 bp.
The variable in the multivariate model with the least influence is the amount issued for a bond. The
higher the log(amount issued), the higher the liquidity. A one standard deviation increase has an effect of
-2.15 bp on the price dispersion. This is the expected result as many papers claim that a certain volume
can be traded more easily within a large issue than within a small issue, although the magnitude of the
effect is quite small.
Overall, we find a strong relationship between our liquidity measure, and bond characteristics and trading
activity. Therefore, we see the liquidity interpretation of our proposed measure confirmed, as it is related
25Note that we only have the rating information at one point in time available, i.e., we cannot detect the
time-series effects of potentially higher liquidity for bonds that are getting close to a rating change, especially on
the cusp between investment and speculative grade. See Mahanti et al. (2008) for a discussion.
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to many variables cited as liquidity proxies by other researchers.
To further validate this result, we analyze the explanatory power of our liquidity measure in predict-
ing established estimators of liquidity in the literature. One important approach to define liquidity is
through the price impact of trading a particular financial instrument. Several measures based on the
price impact have been proposed in the microstructure literature. The measure introduced by Amihud
(2002), indirectly based on the concept introduced by Kyle (1985), is most appropriate for this purpose
and widely accepted in the literature. The Amihud measure is the average ratio of the absolute return
of a particular bond to its trading volume for a given period. Defining the absolute return of a bond on
day t by |rt|, and the trading volume by vt, the Amihud measure for a time period of T days is given as
Amihud measure =
1
T
T∑
t=1
|rt|
vt
(19)
We use the volume-weighted average TRACE price each day to generate the returns. Days on which there
are no trades represent zero return and zero trading volume and are thus not included in the average.
For the calculation of the measure for quarterly intervals, we use the restriction that bonds have to be
traded at least on five days to avoid erratic values for the measure.
A high Amihud measure implies a larger price impact of trading, and therefore, low liquidity. To analyze
the relation between the Amihud measure and our liquidity measure, we first use a univariate regression
where the log(Amihud measure) is the dependent variable. Again, we apply a cross-sectional regression
by calculating time-series averages for the whole time period and the individual quarters. Table 5 shows
the results of these regressions.
[Table 5 around here.]
The results show the expected positive correlation of the Amihud measure with our liquidity measure. The
parameter is statistically significant for all time periods with the expected positive sign. The R2 is high
for all observed time periods (between 19.8% and 31.3%). Again, the regression parameter representing
our liquidity measure stays surprisingly stable over the quarters. The parameter also represents an
economically significant effect. In an overall sense, a one standard deviation increase in our measure
leads to a 300% increase in the Amihud measure.
To analyze whether our proposed measure has explanatory power, over and above other liquidity proxies,
in explaining the Amihud measure, we apply a multivariate regression approach, additionally using all
available bond characteristics and trading activity variables. Results of the multivariate regression model
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are presented in Table 6.
[Table 6 around here.]
The resulting model has high values for R2 (42.5% to 63.7%), with our liquidity measure exhibiting an
economically and statistically significant parameter for all time periods. The size of the parameter is
comparable to that of the univariate model. Most of the other significant parameters are related directly
or indirectly to trading activity, i.e., number of trades, log(trade volume), and log(amount issued) with
the expected negative sign. Note that the bid-ask spread turns out to be insignificant in the multivariate
regression, strengthening the interpretation that the price dispersion measure is the superior measure of
liquidity.26
When we drop our liquidity measure as explanatory variable from the regression, we find a significant
decrease in R2 in the range of eight to ten percentage points, indicating the high explanatory power, over
and above the other covariates. This validation strengthens the interpretation of our liquidity argument.
3.2.3 Hit-Rate Analysis of the Bid-Ask Quotations
Although the price dispersion and its analysis, at the market-wide and bond-specific level, is of main
interest for our research question, it is worthwhile to compare TRACE prices and Markit composites
directly with quoted bid and ask quotations. In many studies, bid-ask quotations (or mid quotations)
have been considered as proxies for traded prices, since such traded prices were not available for the
corporate bond market in prior years (and are still not available for most other OTC markets). These
studies usually assume that most trades take place within the bounds of the bid-ask quotes, and that
these quotations are, therefore, representative. Given our data set for the corporate bond market, we
have the opportunity to evaluate this assumption by quantifying the hit-rate. Our model presented in
Section 2 derives an analytic solution for the hit-rate and shows that the actual ratio depends on the
search costs and the inventory costs, and thus, that the actual hit-rate will not be necessarily close to
100%, as shown in equation (17).
Turning to the data, the volume-weighted hit-rate for the TRACE prices is 51.12% (i.e., in these cases,
the TRACE price lies within the bid and ask range quoted on Bloomberg). The deviations are roughly
symmetric, as out of the misses, 50.12% are lower than the bid prices, and 49.88% are higher then the
26In the regression, we use also a simple liquidity measure often cited by practitioners, i.e., the percentage of
”no-trade” days, as an additional robustness check. This measure turns out to be (incrementally) insignificant in
presence of the price dispersion measure, although it is correlated with liquidity on a stand-alone basis.
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ask prices, respectively. These results indicate that deviations of traded prices from bid-ask quotations
are far more frequent than assumed by most studies. Thus, caution has to be exercised when drawing
conclusions in OTC markets, based on bid-ask quotations. The hit-rate for the Markit composite with
a value of 58.59% is somewhat higher, but surprisingly low as our model assumes a hit-rate of 100% for
this comparison. As there is no theoretical reason for a deviation, we expect that this result indicates
a low data quality of the bid-ask quotations in general, e.g., caused by stale quotes or quotes that hold
only for small quantities.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we present a market microstructure framework, modeling price dispersion effects in over-
the-counter (OTC) markets with market frictions. We show that, in the presence of stochastic inventories
with costs/restrictions for dealers and search costs for investors, traded prices may differ from average
market valuations. We interpret these price dispersions as a liquidity effect and derive a new liquidity
measure, based on a metric of the deviations between the traded prices and their respective market
valuations.
In our empirical implementation, we show results for the US corporate bond market, which presents a
unique opportunity to study this liquidity effect. From October 2004 onwards, all OTC transactions in
this market have to be reported to the centralized TRACE database. Additionally, market-wide aggregate
valuations are available from Markit Group Limited. The combination of these two sources offers us the
opportunity to directly observe price dispersion effects in an OTC market, for the first time.
An analysis at the level of the whole market, as well as at the bond level, shows that according to our
new liquidity measure, price dispersion effects are significantly larger than quoted bid-ask spreads. These
results indicate that the overall liquidity of the corporate bond market is rather low, and that liquidity,
so far, could only be roughly approximated by quotations. Furthermore, we show that our new measure
is indeed related to liquidity. For this purpose, the new measure is regressed on commonly-used liquidity
proxies, i.e., bond characteristics and trading activity variables, as well as established liquidity measures
used in the academic literature. The results show a strong relationship with these proxies. According to
our results, the most important liquidity proxies for corporate bonds are the amount issued, maturity, age,
rating, bid-ask spread, and trading volume, as well as the price impact measure introduced by Amihud
(2002).
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In addition, our results serve as an indirect test of the reliability of end-of-day marks provided by using the
average prices or bid-ask quotations. Calculating a volume-weighted hit-rate, we find that only 51.12%
of the TRACE prices and 58.59% of the Markit quotations lie within the bid and ask range quoted on
Bloomberg. These numbers are far smaller than previously assumed.
Thus, our results are relevant for many applications in OTC markets, such as bond pricing, risk man-
agement, bond issuance decisions, investment decisions, portfolio optimization, and financial market
regulation. Overall, these findings foster a better understanding of OTC markets by analyzing the theo-
retical and empirical drivers of liquidity effects and provide a clear interpretation of different price data
available in these markets to investors.
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Trading Frequency 10/2004 to 10/2005 10/2005 to 10/2006
> 200 days in year 411 392
151-200 days in year 309 369
101-150 days in year 236 322
51-100 days in year 221 222
≤ 50 days in year 444 459
total number of bonds 1621 1704
Table 1: This table shows the trading frequencies of US corporate bonds in our data set, mea-
sured by the number of days per year on which a particular bond is traded. The data set consists
of a matched sample of 1,800 US corporate bonds with 3,889,017 transaction prices during the
period October 2004 to October 2006, based on data from TRACE and Markit.
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Constant Price Dispersion R2 Observations
2004 Q4 -18.192 0.021 0.220 1169
(-220.88***) (18.18***)
2005 Q1 -18.796 0.028 0.239 1308
(-207.59***) (20.29***)
2005 Q2 -18.344 0.022 0.234 1379
(-228.37***) (20.52***)
2005 Q3 -18.296 0.024 0.244 1417
(-248.61***) (21.38***)
2005 Q4 -17.838 0.018 0.198 1439
(-261.99***) (18.88***)
2006 Q1 -18.436 0.026 0.229 1445
(-243.79***) (20.74***)
2006 Q2 -18.487 0.031 0.313 1464
(-259.91***) (25.85***)
2006 Q3 -18.377 0.027 0.273 1426
(-262.90***) (23.14***)
Overall -17.932 0.0251 0.313 1800
(-321.51***) (28.66***)
Table 5: This table shows the results for the cross-sectional regressions, where the logarithmic
Amihud measure is regressed on the proposed liquidity measure. The data set consists of a
matched sample of 1,800 US corporate bonds with 3,889,017 transaction prices during the period
October 2004 to October 2006, based on data from TRACE and Markit. The liquidity measure
is based on the price dispersion and represents the root mean squared difference between TRACE
prices and the respective Markit quotation calculated on a daily basis for each bond. TRACE
prices are the actual traded prices and the Markit quotation represents the average market
valuation, which we interpret as the market’s expectation of the price. Thus, the proposed
measure represents the volatility of the observed price deviations. The cross-sectional linear
regressions use time-weighted averages of all variables. The results based on the whole time
period, as well as based on each available quarter (2004 Q4 to 2006 Q3), are presented.
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Figure 1: This figure shows the distribution of the corporate bonds in our data set across
industries, which are represented by the Bloomberg issuer industry categories. The data set
consists of a matched sample of 1,800 US corporate bonds with 3,889,017 transaction prices
during the period October 2004 to October 2006, based on data from TRACE and Markit.
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Figure 2: This figure shows the distribution of corporate bonds in our data set across rating
grades. The grades represent the issue ratings and are taken from Fitch, Standard & Poor’s, and
Moody’s. Each bond in the data set has at least one rating from one agency. If a bond has more
than one rating, the grade represents the ”average” rating. This average is generated by first
transforming the individual ratings into numeric values (AAA=1 to CCC=7) and then using
the rounded mean as average rating. The data set consists of a matched sample of 1,800 US
corporate bonds with 3,889,017 transaction prices during the period October 2004 to October
2006, based on data from TRACE and Markit.
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Figure 3: This figure analyzes the relation between the proposed liquidity measure and six
bond characteristics and trading activity variables, i.e., maturity, age, amount issued, trade
volume, bid-ask spread, and rating. The liquidity measure is based on the price dispersion and
represents the root mean squared difference between TRACE prices and the respective Markit
quotation calculated on a daily basis for each bond. TRACE prices are the actual traded prices
and the Markit quotation represent the average market valuation, which we interpret as the
market’s expectation of the price. Thus, the proposed measure represents the volatility of the
observed price deviations. In each graphical representation, one point corresponds to one bond
represented by the time-series average value of its price dispersion measure and the relevant
variable. As rating is an ordinal variable, boxplots for each rating grade are added to the
graphical representation. The data set consists of a matched sample of 1,800 US corporate
bonds with 3,889,017 transaction prices during the period October 2004 to October 2006, based
on data from TRACE and Markit.
38
